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INTRODUCTION

Following the favorable response to the Massachusetts Tax Amnesty Program, a significant number
of states have offered their own versions of amnesty. Each state has usually produced one or more reports
reviewing its program and summarizing the results. More recently, several surveys [7,8] have compared
the various characteristics of the different amnesty programs.
From these and other analyses of amnesty some general conclusions have emerged. One is that the
primary motivations for offering amnesty appears to have been 1) to raise revenue in the short run both
by collecting taxes that otherwise would not have been paid and by accelerating the collection of receivables, 2) to raise revenue in the long run by getting new taxpayers onto the tax rolls and keeping
them there, 3) to serve as a politically acceptable way of moving toward stronger enforcement, and 4)
to obtain infonnation that could be used to improve overall tax compliance. While debate continues over
the probable success of amnesty programs in generating revenues, there seems to be general agreement
that the latter two objectives should be attainable.
A review of amnesty program summaries suggests that, at least on paper, the stronger enforcement
objectives have already been met. Many states have increased penalties, added resources to the compliance function, and/or introduced new reporting requirements. However, time must pass and followup studies must be conducted before the full effects of these refonns are known.
Progress toward obtaining infonnation to improve the compliance effort has been slower. One
reason is that detailed data on amnesty participants have not been generally available. Confidentiality
and legal restrictions are partly responsible. However, it also appears that tax administrators in some
states have been unable or unwilling to provide data to outside analysts. In fact, some states have destroyed all detailed records pertaining to their amnesty filers. Fortunately, this is beginning to change,
as several states have generated carefully designed samples from the data in their amnesty files, and are
making them available for further research.
In this paper, we provide infonnation pertment to the complIance ettort by conducting a descriptive
analysis of a sample of participants in the California Tax Amnesty Program. In contrast to other studies,
we concentrate on those filing amended tax returns under amnesty rather than the participants who had
*We wish to thank Mr. James Morandi, Mr. Luis Reves, and Mr. James Shepherd of the California
Tax Franchise Board for helping us gain access to the data used in this study. They are not responsible
for any errors. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the Tax Franchise Board.
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not previously filed. We uncover several patterns in the data which we believe may be of use in improving compliance. In the process, we offer some suggestions for effective administration of an amnesty
program which may be of interest to those who may be considering the introduction of amnesty.
II. BACKGROUND

Since California usually has been included in the various comparative survey articles on state tax
amnesty programs, there is no need to repeat those comparisons. Rather, a brief review of some of the
primary characteri.tic. of the programs should be sufficient.
The California Tax Amnesty Program ran over the ninety days from December 10, 1984 to March
15, 1985. It was narrower in scope than many programs since it applied only to the personal income
and the sales and use taxes. Yet within this scope it was very broadly structured. Those eligible for
amnesty included individuals who, for 1983 or an earlier tax year, had failed to file returns, had filed
inaccurate returns, or were delinquent in paying their tax liabilities. Thus, California allowed taxpayers
on its current accounts receivable to participate. In fact, special notices were sent to these individuals
encouraging them to file under amnesty. On the other hand, amnesty was not available to those already
subject to criminal investigation.
Under the amnesty provisions qualified participants were forgiven unpaid penalties and criminal
prosecution. However, accrued taxes and interest charges were not dismissed. These terms were sufficiently attractive that over 145,000 amnesty returns were filed by 85,701 separate taxpayers. In total,
the program generated $154 million in gross revenue. This is well above the experience of most other
states. Of course, much of this can be attributed to the size of California's population and the fact that
accounts receivable collections were included. Nevertheless, according to California Tax Franchise Board
(CTFB), amnesty produced $34.5 million more revenue than would have been collected through traditional enforcement programs. l
Revenue generation was only one objective of the amnesty program, however. The program "was
also expected to provide valuable information on characteristics of tax evaders and the methods used to
evade taxes." ([2], p. 5). Toward this end, the CTFB selected a stratified random sample of 1,204
amnesty returns covering the tax years 1981-1983. Of these. 1,018 were by individuals who had not
filed an income tax return in the year for which they claimed amnesty, and 186 were by those who
amended their original returns under the program. The data set also included relevant information taken
from the original returns of those taxpayers who filed an amended return.
In creating this sample, the CTFB excluded returns filed by individuals who were either already
known to the CTFB or would have been detected through normal enforcement procedures. To ascertain
the characteristics of these individuals, the CTFB commissioned Sheffrin [9] to conduct a descriptive
study of these data. In doing so, Sheffrin developed profiles of three separate groups of individuals: the
nonfilers for whom the CTFB had no records; the nonfilers for whom there were records in some year
other than the year for which they claimed amnesty; and those individuals who amended their state tax
returns under the program.
Because amnesty participants were primarily nonfilers, Sheffrin devoted most of his attention to
these individuals. One of his most interesting findings was that there appeared to be a noticeable difference between the two types of nonfilers. The first group, those for whom no records existed, possessed
charcteristics generally representative of the California taxpaying population. In contrast, the profile of
the second group was more consistent with the Internal Revenue Service's view that nonfilers are typically low income individuals with limited education. Sheffrin also noted that the third group of taxpayers, those filing an amended return, tended to have higher levels of income relative to the State's
population.
Upon completion of Sheffrin's study, the CTFB furnished us with the same data set. To date, we
have focused our attention primarily on the data for amended return filers. This may seem unusual given
that this group represents only 4 percent of the amnesty returns and only 15 percent of the net revenue
generated. We believe there are several reasons for focusing on the amended returns, however. First,
part of the compliance effort involves selecting returns for audits, which by definition means choosing
among returns that have been filed. Thus, any information that can be obtained about individuals whO
file inaccurate returns may be of use in devising auditing selection rules. Second, these amended return
filers can be used as a new source of data for conducting econometric analysis which can wmplernent
existing theoretical work on income tax evasion. In what follows, we present what we believe are interesting descriptive statistics which profile the nonfilers and briefly summarize the findings of our previous econometric work using these data.
III. ANALYSIS OF AMENDED RETURNS

Prior to conducting any analysis, we carefully reviewed the data on the original and amended returnS
for the 186 amended return filers in the CTFB sample. Our objectives were to check the internal con-
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sistency of the data and to establish that these individuals could reasonably be viewed as evaders. The
primary step in this review was recalculating the tax bill on both the original and amended returns of
each individual in the sample. In the process, we detected a number of problems. These included missing
data, obvious taxpayer or data entry errors, and data inconsistencies which prevented duplication of the
tax calculations. We also encountered a few cases where there was no change or a drop in total tax
liability, which suggested that the individuals in question may not have been evaders.
Observations with one or more of these problems were removed from our sample, so that our sample
was limited to 123 amended return filers. We see no reason to suspect these omissions bias the sample.
In fact, if anything, removing these "problem observations" should improve the accuracy of the profiles
and improve the efficiency of any subsequent econometric estimators.
A. Descriptive Profile

We use two approaches to profile the amended return filers. First we compare average figures from
the original returns of the amnesty participants with the corresponding figures for California taxpayers
as a whole. The objective is to check for unusual values that might serve as identifying characteristics.
Next, we compare the amended returns with the original returns. This is done to determine the relative
magnitude of noncompliance, and to get some indication of the form it took. We also compare the
average figures on the amended returns with the corresponding averages for California as a whole. All
of the relevant figures are provided in Table 1.
We begin with the comparisons of the average figures on the original returns of the amnesty filers
to those of the returns of all California taxpayers. We use 1983 data for all taxpayers as our benchmark.'
The first thing that is apparent is that amended filers do have much higher average incomes. 3 In fact,
they originally reported almost twice the Total and Adjusted Gross Income, and even more Taxable
Income than the taxpaying population as a whole. Part of this may be due to the greater percentage of
joint returns in the amnesty sample. But this higher income pattern holds even when filing status is taken
into account.
The higher income on the amnesty returns came from various sources, most of which exceeded

TABLE I
AVERAGE TAX RETURN FIGURES: AMNESTY RETURNS vs ALL CALIFORNIA
All 1983
California
Returns
Total Income
Adjustments
AGI'
Deductions
Taxable Income
Net Tax
Tax Liability'
Wages
Interest
Dividend
Net Business
Net Capital Gains
Net Pensions
Net Rents
Net Other Income
%
%
%
%
%

Itemized Oed.
Standard Oed.
Single Filers
Joint Filers
Schedule C

Amended Return Amnesty Filers
Original
Return

A. Summary Tax Calculations
22788
45434
481
1192
22306
44242
5313
4005
40237
17246
2278
864
2590
769
B. Selected Sources of Income
17972
30690
4246
1776
588
1010
420
836
7526
950
2247
815
-204
-1221
237
48
C. Selected Other Characteristics
39
54
61
46
28
43
45
66
14
14

Amended
Return

Amount of
Misstatement

48705
454
48251
3749
44503
2693
2933

3271
738
4010
256
4266
415
343

nla
nla
nla
nla
nla
nla
nla
n!a

nla

39
61
43
45
14

'Includes negative incomes, causing a discrepancy with Taxable Income
'Net of Additional Taxes and Credits

nla
nla
nla
nla
nla
nla

n/a
nla
nla
nla
nla
nla
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the California averages. This was particularly true of the interest, capital gain, and pension income
categories. On the other hand, amnesty filers originally reported less net business income and "other"
income, and greater rental losses.
Several other interesting observations can be made as well. For example, the amnesty filers tended
to claim considerably more adjustments in moving from Total Income to AGI. On the other hand, their
average deductions are well below the state averages. This occurs despite the fact that a much greater
percentage of the amended filers claimed itemized deductions. Somewhat surprisingly, the percentage
of Schedule C filers (i.e., those with business income) in the amnesty sample is in line with that population as a v,'hole.
Next we compared the original amnesty returns with the amended returns. Assuming the amended
returns represent the "truth," the difference between values reported on these two returns indicates the
extent of evasion. Since evasion can take place in a number of ways, we make several comparisons.
Perhaps most interesting is the comparison of the tax liabilities. This is not only the broadest measure in that it reflects all types of evasion, but it is also indicative of the direct revenue loss due to
noncompliance. In our sample, the average tax liability was understated by $343. This is about 12 percent
of the true tax bill and over 40 percent of the average overall state tax liability.
The sources of tax underpayment can be identified by calculating several income-based evasion
measures. We do this by comparing the Total, Adjusted Gross, and Taxable Income figures on the
original and amended returns. From the figures in Table 1 it is clear that the majority of the underpayment
is due to the fact that true total income was understated by an average of $3,271 or 10 percent. This
represents pure underreporting of income. Comparing the AGI and Taxable Income figures means adding
in overstatement of adjustments and deductions, respectively. Clearly, after pure income underreporting,
the next most important form of noncompliance was the overstatement of adjustments by an average of
$738. The much smaller average overstatement of deductions accounts for most of the remainder of the
noncompliance.
This pattern also emerges from a comparison of the amended returns to all California returns. Of
course, income reported on amended returns exceeds that on original returns. Thus the amended figures
exceed the benchmark values by an even greater amount. By the same reasoning, the deductions on the
amended returns are even lower relative to the benchmark values than were those on the original returns.
On the other hand, the adjustments figures are now in line with the benchmark rather than overstated,
suggesting that high income levels and large adjustments may be good flags for audit purposes.
Given these patterns, we explored the nature of the noncompliance behavior in a bit more detail.
We first tallied the individuals who underreported income as opposed to overstating adjustments or
deductions. These are shown in Part A of Table 2. This tally indicates that people tended to evade by
using only one general approach, and that by far the most popular approach was underreporting of true
total income. Indeed, over 50 percent of our sample used pure income underreporting as the sole type
of noncompliance. A little more than 34 percent of the other filers made use of overstatements of adjustments alone. In contrast, less than 2 percent overstated only their deductions and less than 14 percent
evaded in some combination of these approaches.
To investigate this further, we examined the self-reported descriptions of the misstatements on the
original return. A summary is provided in Parts Band C of Table 2. Based on these responses we found
that, for those who gave reasons, on average, 1.1 detailed items had been misstated. In fact, over 80%
reported only one type of detailed activity and almost 14 percent misstated only two items. Among the
most frequently cited forms of understated income were: wages, other interest income, other income,
and capital gains. The most popular deductions overstated were the medical and dental category.
To see if any of this noncompliance was likely to have been detected in the absence of an amnesty
program, we asked the CTFB to give us an idea of the likelihood of audit under normal procedures.
The Board did this by categorizing each return in the sample as having had a high, medium, or loW
probability of audit, based upon the information on the original return and the audit selection criteria in
use at the time of filing. This exercise indicated that two thirds of the sample had a low probability of
audit, 31 percent had a medium chance, and only 2 percent had a relatively high probability of being
audited. While this may be due to the fact that audit rates in general were quite low, it does suggest
that, in addition to the net new revenue which was produced, the amnesty program has also generated
some new information on the activities of those evaders who file inaccurate returns.
B. Econometric Analysis

Elsewhere [6] we present econometric analysis using these data. Our objectives were to demonstrate
how amnesty data could be used for empirical analysis of tax evasion, and to provide insight into the
nature of the relationship between evasion and tax rates. Details such as the theoretical underpinnings
of our model and the advantages and disadvantages of our evasion measures can be found in that paper.
Here we summarize the major findings.
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TABLE 2
APPROACHES TO EVASION
Item

Number Reporting

A. Broad Categories
Income Underreporting Only
Overstated Adjustments Only
Overstated Deductions Only
Misstated Income & Deductions
Misstated Adjustments & Deductions
All Items Misstated
B. Detailed Income Categories
Other Interest Income
Other Income
Wages
Capital Gains
Dividends
Pensions
Partnerships
Rents
Tips
C. Detailed Deduction & Credit Categories
Medical/Dental
Other
Contributions
Other Deductions
Interest
Other Credits

62
42
2
8
7
2

29
27
14
9

6
4
4
3
I

7
2
2
2

I
34

The econometric work involved mUltiple regression analysis in which four measures of evasion
were each regressed on the level of true income and the marginal tax rate, along with controls for such
factors as the probability of detection, occupation, and marital status. The evasion measures were calculated by taking the difference between I) the tax liabilities, 2) Taxable Income, 3) Adjusted Gross
Income, and 4) Total Income as reported on the original and amended returns. True income was taken
to be the total income figure on the amended return, and the marginal tax rate was determined using
the Taxable Income on that return and the appropriate tax table. Based on the comparative static results
of standard theoretical evasion models, we expected income to have a statistically significant positive
effect on evasion, while the sign for the tax rate, was a priori indeterminate.'
The regression results indicated that income has the expected positive effect on evasion, a result
consistent with previous empirical evasion studies using other sources of data. This also offers some
support for the popular use of income as a factor in making audit selections. Perhaps of more interest
is the fact that the marginal tax rate variable was positively and statistically significantly related to
evasion in all four equations.
We find the positive link between evasion and marginal tax rates quite interesting. It is consistent
with an important previous empirical finding [4], and it is intuitively appealing. Most casual observers
expect higher tax rates to lead to increased evasion. In addition, the positive link is consistent with the
usual microtheoretic prediction that the substitution effect of a relative price change normally outweighs
the income effect. Our finding does run counter to a view held within the IRS, however [5].
To determine the relative magnitude of the effects of income and tax rates on evasion, we converted
the corresponding parameter estimates into elasticities using mean values. This revealed a notable difference. The various measures of evasion proved to be more responsive to changes in marginal tax
rates than to cha..-tges in true income. In fact, the tax rate response

\\'a5

consistently elastic, ranging from

1.31 to 2.25, while the income elasticities were between 0.19 and 0.28, which is well in the inelastic
range.
The finding that income tax evasion is sensitive to marginal tax rate changes has implications for
budget and compliance policy. From a budgetary perspective, this result provides some support for the
"supply-side" argument that cutting marginal tax rates can be partially self-funding in that it will induce
some income hidden in the "underground" economy to become part of the tax base. From a compliance
perspective, the positive link between tax rates and evasion suggests that enforcement efforts may need
to be adjusted as tax rates are altered by the legislatures.
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IV.

SOME LESSONS

We conclude by suggesting some possible lessons which may be learned from our work with the
California Tax Amnesty Data. These include insights into evasion activity, issues to consider in improving compliance policy, and suggestions for administering an amnesty program. We note, however,
that some of these observations have been made previously by Sheffrin [9].
First, Sheffrin's analysis of nonfilers tends to confIrm several widely held beliefs about evasion.
For example, there is evidence that some nonfilers are low income individuals who drift in and out of
the system. There is also evidence that th.e self-employed are likely to be involved. Yet there are also
a few surprises. For example, wage, interest, and dividend income figured prominently on the amnesty
returns. In addition, many nonfilers had significant incomes and had filed returns in previous years.
This suggests that states already have some information at their disposal which could be used more
effectively to track down this group of evaders.
Some of these insights are confIrmed by our analysis of the amended return filers. For example,
a signifIcant amount of evasion took place on filed tax returns, and that this was usually done by misstating one item. The most common item was true income, although signifIcant overstatements of adjustments also occurred. As with the nonfilers, wages and interest income was frequently a part of the
noncompliance. We also found evidence that evasion was responsive to changes in marginal tax rates.
These fIndings lead to several suggestions for improving compliance efforts. Most obvious is that
a careful matching of tax return figures with the information provided by banks, employers, etc., would
be a worthwhile undertaking. Further, given the number of nonfilers who had filed in a previous year,
a careful follow-up on individuals that apparently drop out of the system would be warranted.
Analysis of the amended filers indicates that several return characteristics may be useful in identifying returns containing inaccurate information. In particular, returns with high total income and adjustments, unusually large interest, capital gains, and pension income, and/or low business or "other"
income would seem to be good candidates for an audit. Of course, more analysis is needed to determine
the effectiveness of these items in flagging noncompliant returns.
From an administrative perspective, the California experience suggests that short-run net new revenue can be generated from a carefully designed and well-publicized amnesty program. A strong publicity effort appears to be critical for revenue generation. The experiences of other states which had more
limited promotional expenditures were much less favorable.
As for achieving success in obtaining useful information for compliance purposes, it is clear that
advance planning and adequate resources are needed. There is the potential for a good deal of information
to be obtained. But this requires thought as to what information is to be requested on amnesty returns,
as well as to what supplemental fIgures should be collected from the original returns. It also requires
that there be suffIcient funding and staff so that the returns can be accurately processed, and that the
amnesty returns be isolated for subsequent analysis (if this is legally permissible).
California appears to be one of few states which have taken this approach. Conversations with
authorities from other states led us to believe that some could not have created a useful amnesty data
set even if they were legally permitted to and were interested in doing so. In our opinion, it is truly
unfortunate that some potentially useful information has been lost.
A fInal administrative recommendation is that amnesty returns should be as detailed as possible.
The "other" category appeared a bit too frequently in our tallies. In particular, we found other income,
other interest income, and other credits to be important sources of noncompliance. A related matter is
that care should be taken to be sure the forms are fIlled out completely and the data transcribed correctly
to machine-readable form. We found that missing information, inconsistent information, and data entry
errors greatly complicated the task of extracting useful information from the data.
As a fInal thought, we would like to offer several suggestions for further research in this area. The
most obvious is to replicate this type of descriptive and econometric analysis for other states in order
to see if similar patterns are obtained. Another potentially informative activity would be to carefully
match state amnesty returns with the associated federal returns. The IRS is convinced that there is little
new information for them in the state amnesty programs. However, we believe this view is premature
in that it is based on a review of only three of the earlier programs. In any case, even if the IRS view
is substantiated, such a finding would offer the states some evidence that the matching of federal and
state returns could be a productive approach to detecting noncompliance at the state level.
FOOTNOTES

'The cost of administering and publicizing the program was $5.8 million. Thus amnesty generated
almost $6 of new revenue that would not otherwise have been collected for every dollar spent. Of course.
this should be compared with the marginal return to increases in traditional enforcement procedures to
determine if amnesty is a preferable approach to improved compliance.
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'These patterns generally follow for year-by-year comparisons as welL
3These mean figures may be biased upward somewhat for several reasons. First, there is substantial
variation in the sample, with several large observations. Using medians produces similar results, but the
differences are not nearly as large. Second, the benchmark averages are based on all returns filed. It
might be preferable to use taxable returns only. Once again, this causes the difference in average income
between the amended filers and the benchmark to be smaller, but once again this does not alter the basic
conclusion.
"'Theoretical models are ambiguous because a change in the tax rate produces an income and a
substitution effect which may oppose one another. The outcome depends on the nature of risk aversion
and the relative magnitudes of the two effects. For details see Allingham and Sandmo [1] and Yitzhaki
[iO].
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INTRODUCTION

At least one tax collected directly from businesses has been eligible in nearly every state tax amnesty
program, and those taxes, especially sales and corporate income taxes, have accounted for a substantial
amount of amnesty collections. Most of the discussion and research about tax amnesty, and tax evasion
for that matter, has focused on individuals. although there are several reasons to believe that business
participation in an amnesty might be fundamentally different than for individuals. Therefore, we report
in this paper the results of a detailed study of business taxpayer participation in the Michigan amnesty
*The authors appreciate the cooperation of the Bureau of Revenue of the Michigan Department of
Treasury in providing data and financial support for part of this work. The assistance of Susan W. Martin,
Stanley Borawski and Eric Krupka is greatly appreciated. The conclusions and opinions expressed in
this paper are the authors' alone and do not represent opinions or conclusions of the Michigan Department
of Treasury .

